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Bioethics:
Whence Do We Derive the Norms?
Sean O'Reilly, M.D., F.R.C.P.

Dr. O'Reilly, author of the book Our Name Is Peter, is a professor
of neurology and direc tor of the post-doctoral research training program in neurobiology at the George Washington University Medical
Center.
The Christian, especially the informed Catholic, has a certain diffi·
culty when it comes to a question such as that posed in the title of
this presentation. He is in much the same position as the innkeeper,
Humphrey Pump, in Chesterton's allegorical novel, The Flying Inn.
Pump had difficulty in composing a fanciful poem about the meanderings of the "The Road to Roundabout." " I write under a great disadvantage," he said. "You see, I know why the road curves about!"
So it is with the Catholic scientist or physician. He knows, or
should know, the real answer; he can engage in speculation about
possible answers only as a didactic exercise or by way of dialog with
those who profess not to know and to have open minds about the
matter.
It is in the interest of such a didactic exercise and a possible dialog
that I chose the above title.
I hope to clarify certain terms and expressions, and indicate some
approaches to refutation of the answers to the question provided by
materialists, rationalists and secular humanists . I will affirm a thesis,
largely by way of propositional statements. In this way I hope to
clarify the Catholic Christian answer to this question and lay a suitable
groundwork for the speakers who will follow me.
Bioethics is that branch of ethics having to do with human actions
in relation to life and death issues. I said " life and death ," though
etymology of the term "bioethics" refers only to life . For death is a
part of life, a necessary part so far as physical life and the spiritual life
are concerned. It is all too often a part, though not a necessary one, of
the emotional life and the moral life of each human being.
I also said ethics and bioethics are concerned with human actions not all human actions, but only those which are specifically human,
such as intellection and Willing. Furthermore, of these specifically
human acts, only those which are deliberate acts of the free will,
placed with knowledge and advertence, can be morally responsible or
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irresponsible. Thus ethics and bioethics are concerned with voluntary
human acts .
Immediately we run into a road block in our attempted dialog with
agnostics, notoriously those who are not true agnostics in the proper
sense of the term, but really ideologs - materialistic, deterministic,
atheistic, dogmatic - as only they can be! "All matter, " they will say,
"is made up of the same fundamental particles, whose properties and
actions can be elucidated and understood only by application of rigorous scientific method - all matter, including living matter. All man's
actions, his behavior, will ultimately be explainable in terms of his
genes, his constituent molecules, atoms and subatomic particles. There
is no free will, no such thing as spirit. How could there be , since
experimental science, which alone has access to the reality of things,
can find no evidence of such?"
A Commonly Prevalent View
Not all scientists or even pseudo-scientists are such gross materialists.
The most commonly prevalent view of man among agnostic scientists
is humanism , appropriately labeled secular humanism. One such
humanist put it in a nutshell at a conference on ethical issues in
genetics a few years ago.
Some of us , though profoundly awed by the unive rsal as we appre ciate it,
do not believe in a supernatural God and we reject divine au thority for an
ethical code. Nor can we accept the idea of an e ternal , universal , absolute
ethics imprinte d in the conscience of man .. . . It se ems to me , therefore ,
that the authority for ethical decisions, for decisions as to what is right and
good , come from man himself, from his own choices, individually and in
groups.... The touchstone of man's choices, of his ethical choices, is
simply his judgment of whether it is right and good for man. Man is th e
measure of all things! 1

Now, what could you say in response to the first kind of infidel the kind who believes that all man 's acts and actions are explainable in
mechanistic terms - in terms of probability theory, considering his
genetic make-up, acting and reacting to his environment?
You might try what could be called the Christopher Derrick
approach - well-reasoned irony. You might say to your materialistic
scientific secular humanist: "If you believe all you say about behavior
being exclusively determined by subatomic, atomic and molecular
actions and reactions, all going on according to established scientific
principles and laws; and if you really do not believe there is such a
thing as moral evil, but only lesser and greater goods, how could you
possibly complain if I decided to choose what you should consider
merely a lesser good? What if my chemical reactions compelled me to
knock you off because your obstinate schizophrenic rejection of reality is evil in my eyes?
I know it would be morally wrong for me to do so. But how could
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you know? I submit you could not, if you do not accept the moral
order as a fact. I say you could not ever know if my action could be
explained in terms of my genes, or my sociological data, or the 'random walk' of my molecules which, somehow, in some way as yet
unknown to science, had been converted into a murderous directionality. And even if you understood the chemistry and the biophysics of
my act, what sanction could you invoke against me if you do not
believe in God? Does it, in fact, matter one whit what I do to you if
there is no God?"
There is a second approach, if your friend is at all capable of logical
thought; it is particularly directed to the secular humanist. This is an
approach used very effectively by Arthur Dyck, professor of population ethics at Harvard, in his lectures and writings. It consists in a
logical analysis of the various ethical systems of thought thrown up by
rationalism, scientism and secular humanism - from utilitarian theory
to situation ethics. All these can be shown to be involved ultimately in
a fundamental logical contradiction, namely, that moral goods can be
determined and evaluated by non-moral means. There are many other
contradictions in such systems but we do not have the time to discuss
them.
I want to put before you a third approach for your consideration, an
approach directed to both materialists and secular humanists.
If we accepted for didactic purposes and for the sake of dialog the
equation of "science" with "experimental science" and if rigorous
scientific method is the only way to knowledge of reality, then we
would have to assert that science in such a restricted sense cannot have
anything to say about such abstract things as good, evil, truth, justice,
virtue, love. To hold otherwise would be unscientific, and we should
expect the majority of honest scientists to agree with us on this. If so,
they may be willing to listen further. For we must go further and
affirm that positive experimental science, of its very nature, cannot
contribute to moral theory or to bioethics specifically.
Two Reasons Cited
This is so for two good and sufficient reasons:
1. Positive science knows nothing about freedom .
2. For "science," absolute truth is unobtainable; in fact, it does not
exist.
We mean, of course, human freedom, since science does speak of
"freedom" and "degrees of freedom"; this however, at best consists of
the "random walk" of probability theory. Concerning these two
notions, truth and freedom, we can say that if there is no absolute
truth, the best we could come up with would be a relativistic bioethics. If there is no human freedom, if man has no free will there can
be no ethics ; no ethical question arises or could arise.
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The notion of freedom, therefore, is of prior importance in ethics.
One must come to grips with this question of human freedom, because
if we do not understand it correctly, we can only be led into a quagmire of moral relativism, subjectivism and downright contradiction.
On the subject of liberty and freedom, all I want to say is that it is
becoming more and more evident that the confusion of what passes
for modern ethical thought, the degradation of the medical profession,
the secularization of Catholic higher education and the perversion of
Catholic moral philosophy and theology, are due in large part to tacit
acceptance of Hegel's false definition of human freedom.
I want to conclude this presentation with a series of summary propositional statements:
Ethics is concerned with realities of an order which transcends the
physical order of the universe - an order that is outside the purview
of science, as science has been defined by scientists. This order is
called the moral order; it is an order of realitites called values.
The fundamental values in the moral order - goodness, truth, honesty, sincerity , fidelity, etc. - are immediate "givens." What this
means is that man, by unaided reason, can know the general principles
of right and wrong conduct in their fundamental and simplest applications: it is possible for a pagan to be honest or dishonest, loyal or disloyal, selfish or unselfish , truthful or a liar. The moral values are realities
that are important - important for man if he is to live a truly human
life. Above all they are important in themselves: they exist whether
man chooses to accept them or not.
The values in question, once grasped, evoke a response, a categorical
obligation which impresses itself in such a way that man cannot ignore
or reject it without uneasiness. 2
Man Free to Choose
Man is free to ignore the obligation: he is free to choose. He is not
free to choose equally freely between good and evil. In practical
terms, this means he seeks to justify his choice of evil by conceiving of
it or presenting it to himself as a "good." But he is free to choose, or
else the moral order would not apply to him : no ethical question
would or could arise.
Grasping these immediate "givens" is one thing. It is another to
apply them to the life and actions of man, to interpret what the
obligation imposed by moral values means in practice. How should
man act so as to secure these values? Obviously there is need for a set
of principles, rules, norms, whereby man may judge his actions in
relation to moral values. Hence ethics is a normative science. We
rejected positive science, materialism , secular humanism as the source
of ethical norms. Whence then do we derive the norms? For the Christian there is only one answer - God.
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The moral order essentially presupposes God. Like the physical
order of the universe , it can lead man to at least a knowledge of the
existence of God as the source of these realities and of the sanctions
implied in the notion of obligation.
However, an explicit knowledge and acknowledgment of the existence of God are not necessary for moral choice. That is to say, th ere is
a natural moral order which obligates man; a natural moral philosophy
can be developed as the ancient Greeks did. A natural moral law exists
which binds all humans insofar as they are free human beings.
There is, however, yet another order - the supernatural orderwhich transcends the natural moral order. It is an order of which man
has always seemed to be dimly and confusedly aware. This supernatural order, the order of spirit, has been revealed to man by God. The
knowledge so imparted and the obligations which stem from it do not
negate the natural order; rather, the latter is elevated, ennobled and
perfected.
This public and formal revelation of God, recorded in the Old Testament and the New, culminated in the Person, the life and teachings,
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, the Second Person of the
Blessed Trinity , Who became Man. He entrusted that revelation to the
Church which He founded on Peter and the other Apostles, that
Church which has continued the Incarnation in time, in a real, though
mystical way. 3
The only true and valid ethics for man, therefore, stems from the
integral vision of man provided by God's revelation - conserved, interpreted and taught by the Church founded by His Son, Our Lord.
As von Hildebrand says, the one true, valid ethics for man is Christian ethics. 4 Only such an ethics can begin to provide definitive
answers to the multifarious moral questions that beset man. It is
indeed a humanist ethics, but Christian, not secular. It is the only
ethics that can do justice to man in his entire nature, personal and
social, because it does justice to God. It can reconcile man to man,
because it reco nciles man to God.
In God's providence, bioethics of this kind is the straight and narrow way leading to eternal life.
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